The Perdereau ruling, delivered by the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation on January 16, 1986, established a rule that still structures French criminal law: an attempted murder can be prosecuted even when the victim is already deceased at the time of the acts. This decision, often cited in textbooks, deserves to be revisited in light of current criminal practices and the doctrinal debates it continues to fuel.
Impossible offense in criminal law: why the notion remains technical
Before returning to the facts of the case, it is essential to understand what constitutes an impossible offense. The concept refers to a situation where a person voluntarily performs all the necessary acts to commit an offense, but where it could not materially succeed. Two hypotheses are traditionally distinguished.
- The means employed are ineffective in producing the desired result (for example, attempting an abortion with substances that have no abortifacient effect).
- The very object of the offense does not exist or is not in the state assumed by the perpetrator (reaching into an empty pocket to steal, or striking a corpse believing it to be a living person).
- In both cases, the criminal intent exists, but the result is materially unattainable.
The central legal question is as follows: should one punish someone who intended to commit a crime but was unable to do so? For a long time, the doctrine was divided between those who believed that there could be no attempt without the possibility of a result, and those for whom the guilty intent was sufficient to justify prosecution.
It is in this context that the Perdereau ruling made a decisive judgment, adopting a firm position. For those who wish to find explanations on the Perdereau ruling with details of the procedure, the case summary allows one to locate each step of the judicial reasoning.
Perdereau ruling of January 16, 1986: the facts and reasoning of the Court of Cassation
The facts are brutal. Following a violent brawl, one individual (Mr. Charaux) struck the victim with a metal bar, then pressed this bar against his neck until he stopped breathing. The victim was then left abandoned at the scene.
The next day, a second participant, Mr. Perdereau, returned to the scene and struck the head of the lifeless body with stones. The autopsy revealed that the victim was already dead at the time Perdereau struck him. Objectively, killing a person who is already deceased is materially impossible.
The Court of Appeal had acquitted Perdereau, considering that the attempted murder could not be retained on a corpse. The criminal chamber overturned this decision. Its reasoning is based on Article 2 of the former Penal Code (now Article 121-5 of the current Penal Code): an attempt is constituted as soon as there is a commencement of execution and the offense has only been missed due to circumstances independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The Court held that the circumstance of the victim’s prior death was independent of Perdereau’s will. He believed he was striking a living person. His homicidal intent was established, and his acts constituted a commencement of execution. The fact that the result is impossible did not negate the attempt.
Attempted murder and impossible offense: what the ruling changed in criminal jurisprudence
Before 1986, the jurisprudence was not uniform regarding the treatment of impossible offenses. Some decisions refused to qualify an attempt when the object of the offense did not exist. The Perdereau ruling ended this hesitation by establishing a clear principle: an impossible offense can constitute a punishable attempt.
This principle has been confirmed and has not been challenged by the 1994 reform of the Penal Code. Article 121-5 retains the structure of the former provision without altering the logic. The attempt remains defined by the commencement of execution and the absence of voluntary withdrawal, without requiring that the result be objectively achievable.
Scope beyond intentional homicide
The solution established by the Perdereau ruling is not limited to attempted murder. It permeates the entire law of attempts. As long as the agent has manifested criminal intent through material acts, the impossibility of the result (whether due to means or object) does not constitute an obstacle to prosecution.
This interpretation reinforces the subjective dimension of French criminal law regarding attempts. What matters is the danger revealed by the act and the intent, not the result actually produced.
Qualification of attempted murder: current stakes for practitioners
The Perdereau ruling remains a reference in criminal law training, but its implications extend beyond the academic framework. Several recent developments in judicial practice renew its relevance.
Criminal defense attorneys have observed in recent years a trend among prosecutors to more frequently resort to the qualification of attempted murder in cases of serious violence with weapons. Where a qualification of aggravated voluntary violence was sometimes retained, attempted murder is now preferred to emphasize the seriousness of the facts, particularly in high-profile cases or those involving firearms.
This choice of qualification is not neutral. The attempt at a crime is systematically punishable under French law, and the penalties incurred (criminal imprisonment) are significantly heavier than those provided for aggravated violence offenses. For the defense, the dividing line between intent to kill and intent to seriously injure then becomes the main ground for contestation.
The Perdereau ruling directly illuminates this debate: the proof of homicidal intent takes precedence over the material result. When the prosecution retains the charge of attempted murder, it relies on the subjective logic established by this ruling. The defense, for its part, may attempt to demonstrate the absence of a commencement of execution or the existence of a voluntary withdrawal.
The Perdereau ruling has never been contradicted by the Court of Cassation since 1986. Its scope remains intact, and criminal law practitioners continue to refer to it whenever the qualification of an attempt encounters a material impossibility. The question of intent, at its core, remains the pivot of the French repressive system.